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Canadian Bijuralism At A Crossroad? 
The Impact Of Section 8.1 Of The 
Interpretation Act On Judicial 
Interpretation Of Federal Legislation
ALINE GRENON*
*  Aline Grenon is a member of the Law Society of Upper Canada and of the Barreau du 
Québec. She is currently a Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Law of the Université de 
Montréal, having retired as Full Professor from the French Common Law Program of 
the University of Ottawa in 2013. This article is a revised and updated English-language 
version of Aline Grenon, “Le bijuridisme canadien à la croisée des chemins? Réflexions sur 
l’incidence de l’article 8.1 de la Loi d’interprétation” (2011) 56:4 McGill LJ 775. The author 
thanks Mélanie Beaumier, a student in the National Program of the University of Ottawa, 
Faculty of Law, for her invaluable assistance. The author also thanks the many colleagues who 
reviewed and commented on the article.
Section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act affirms the equal authority of the common law and civil 
law in the field of property and civil rights. The section states, subject to two exceptions, that 
federal enactments based on rules and concepts that are part of the law of property and 
civil rights are to be interpreted in accordance with these rules and concepts. Prior to the 
enactment of section 8.1 in 2001, courts had a tendency to opt for a uniform application of 
federal legislation based on common law concepts, with often negative results for Quebec 
civil law. Since then, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has had a number of opportunities 
to interpret federal legislation in light of section 8.1. Following an analysis of the Court’s 
decisions, the author concludes that the SCC has had an ambivalent rapport with section 8.1, 
and has not yet subjected it to in-depth analysis or explained its underlying objectives. The 
author emphasizes that section 8.1 has the potential to promote exchanges between Quebec 
civil law and Canadian common law at the level of federal legislation and submits proposals 
in this regard.
L’article 8.1 de la Loi d’interprétation met sur un pied d’égalité la common law et le code civil 
dans le domaine des droits de propriété et civils. Cet article énonce, à deux exceptions près, 
que les promulgations fédérales reposant sur les règles et les concepts qui font partie du 
droit de la propriété et des droits civils doivent être interprétées conformément à ces règles 
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et concepts. Avant la promulgation de l’article 8.1 en 2001, les tribunaux avaient tendance à 
opter pour une application uniforme des lois fédérales axées sur des concepts de common 
law, ce qui allait souvent à l’encontre du code civil du Québec. Depuis 2001, la Cour suprême 
du Canada a souvent eu l’occasion d’interpréter des lois fédérales à la lumière de l’article 
8.1. À la suite d’une analyse de ses jugements, l’auteur conclut que la Cour suprême du 
Canada possède une attitude ambivalente devant l’article 8.1, ne l’a pas encore soumis à une 
analyse en profondeur et n’en a pas expliqué les objectifs sous jacents. L’auteur souligne que 
l’article 8.1 pourrait promouvoir les échanges entre le code civil du Québec et la common law 
canadienne au niveau de la législation fédérale et il présente des propositions à cet égard.
I. INTRODUCTION
CANADA IS OCCASIONALLY REFERRED to as being multijural or plurijural 
because of the existence of variations in the law among its multiple jurisdictions 
and because of the growing importance of aboriginal law. It is also often referred 
to as being bijural. In the Canadian context, the terms “bijural” and “bijuralism” 
have a very specific meaning: they refer to the relationship between civil law 
and common law.1 That relationship is primarily limited to federal legislation 
1. France Allard, “The Supreme Court of Canada and its Impact on the Expression of 
Bijuralism” in The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of 
Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism, 2d ed, booklet 3 (Ottawa: Minister of Justice and Attorney 
General of Canada, 2001) 1 at 1: 
Bijuralism can be approached from several angles. The simple co-existence of two legal 
traditions, the interaction between two traditions, the formal integration of two traditions 
within a given context (e.g. in an agreement or a legal text) or, on a more general level, the 
recognition of and respect for the cultures and identities of two legal traditions. However, 
beyond the factual situation that it presupposes with respect to the co-existence of traditions, 
bijuralism raises the issue of the interaction or relationship between different legal traditions. 
In general and especially in the Canadian context, it calls for an examination of the relationship 
between civil law and common law.
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and it has on occasion given rise to tension and dissonance, particularly when 
well-meaning judges sought to achieve a uniform, pan-Canadian application 
of federal legislation by resorting to common law concepts, thereby skewing 
Quebec civil law in the process. Such decisions have been the subject of consider-
able commentary, by Quebec authors in particular.2
In 2001, sections 8.1 and 8.2 were added to the Interpretation Act.3 Since section 
8.1, the full text of which is set out in Part II, is the more important of the two, only 
2. See e.g. Jean Leclair, “L’interface entre le droit commun privé provincial et les compétences 
fédérales ‘attractives’” in Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale, ed, Un cocktail de 
droit d’auteurs (Montreal: Éditions Thémis, 2007) [Leclair, “L’interface entre le droit”]; Guy 
Lefebvre, “L’uniformisation du droit maritime canadien aux dépens du droit civil québécois: 
lorsque l’infidélité se propage de la Cour suprême à la Cour d’appel du Québec” (1997) 
31:2 RJT 577; Rosalie Jukier & Roderick A Macdonald, “The New Quebec Civil Code and 
Recent Federal Law Reform Proposals: Rehabilitating Commercial Law in Quebec?” (1992) 
20:2 Can Bus LJ 380 at 398-404; Roderick A Macdonald, “Provincial Law and Federal 
Commercial Law: Is ‘Atomic Slipper’ a New Beginning?” (1991-1992) 7 BFLR 437; H 
Patrick Glenn, “Le droit comparé et la Cour suprême du Canada” in Ernest Caparros et al, 
eds, Mélanges Louis-Philippe Pigeon (Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1989) 197.
3. RSC 1985, c I-21. In essence, the Act contains rules to facilitate the interpretation of 
federal enactments. This is apparent from its long title, An Act respecting the interpretation 
of statutes and regulations. Section 3 states that every provision of the Act “applies, unless 
a contrary intention appears, to every enactment.” Sections 8.1 and 8.2 were added to the 
Interpretation Act by the First Harmonization Act effictive 1 June 2011 (Federal Law-Civil 
Law Harmonization Act, No 1, SC 2001, c 4 [First Harmonization Act]). The preamble of the 
First Harmonization Act states:
WHEREAS all Canadians are entitled to access to federal legislation in keeping with the 
common law and civil law traditions;
WHEREAS the civil law tradition of the Province of Quebec, which finds its principal 
expression in the Civil Code of Québec, reflects the unique character of Quebec society;
WHEREAS the harmonious interaction of federal legislation and provincial legislation is 
essential and lies in an interpretation of federal legislation that is compatible with the common 
law or civil law traditions, as the case may be;
WHEREAS the full development of our two major legal traditions gives Canadians enhanced 
opportunities worldwide and facilitates exchanges with the vast majority of other countries;
WHEREAS the provincial law, in relation to property and civil rights, is the law that completes 
federal legislation when applied in a province, unless otherwise provided by law;
WHEREAS the objective of the Government of Canada is to facilitate access to federal 
legislation that takes into account the common law and civil law traditions, in its English and 
French versions;
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it will be the subject of detailed analysis in this article. Section 8.1 affirms the equal 
authority of the common law and civil law in the field of property and civil rights 
and states, subject to two exceptions, that federal enactments based on rules and 
concepts that are part of the law of property and civil rights are to be interpreted in 
AND WHEREAS the Government of Canada has established a harmonization program of 
federal legislation with the civil law of the Province of Quebec to ensure that each language 
version takes into account the common law and civil law traditions;
NOW, THEREFORE, Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and 
House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows… .
Attendu :
que tous les Canadiens doivent avoir accès à une législation fédérale conforme aux traditions 
de droit civil et de common law;
que la tradition de droit civil de la province de Québec, qui trouve sa principale expression 
dans le Code civil du Québec, témoigne du caractère unique de la société québécoise;
qu’une interaction harmonieuse de la législation fédérale et de la législation provinciale 
s’impose et passe par une interprétation de la législation fédérale qui soit compatible avec la 
tradition de droit civil ou de common law, selon le cas;
que le plein épanouissement de nos deux grandes traditions juridiques offre aux Canadiens des 
possibilités accrues de par le monde et facilite les échanges avec la grande majorité des autres 
pays;
que, sauf règle de droit s’y opposant, le droit provincial en matière de propriété et de droits 
civils est le droit supplétif pour ce qui est de l’application de la législation fédérale dans les 
provinces;
que le gouvernement du Canada a pour objectif de faciliter l’accès à une législation fédérale 
qui tienne compte, dans ses versions française et anglaise, des traditions de droit civil et de 
common law;
qu’en conséquence, le gouvernement du Canada a institué un programme d’harmonisation 
de la législation fédérale avec le droit civil de la province de Québec pour que chaque version 
linguistique tienne compte des traditions de droit civil et de common law,
Sa Majesté, sur l’avis et avec le consentement du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes du 
Canada, édicte… .
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accordance with “the rules, principles and concepts in force in the province at the 
time the enactment is being applied.”4
How has this section fared since its enactment? Part II describes the raison 
d’être of section 8.1 and summarizes the methods proposed by three authors with 
respect to its application. In Part III, relevant decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Canada (SCC or the Court) delivered since 2001 are the subject of analysis and 
commentary. How has the SCC made use of section 8.1? Has the SCC adopted, 
in whole or in part, the methods proposed by the authors? In Part IV, the author 
comments in more detail on the impact of this jurisprudence and emphasizes 
that section 8.1 has the potential to promote ongoing exchanges between Quebec 
civil law and Canadian common law at the level of federal legislation. In order to 
encourage that potential, the author submits a number of proposals.
II. SECTION 8.1 AND THE INTERPRETATION OF BIJURAL 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Numerous texts have considered the raison d’être of section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act.5 
Accordingly, only a brief explanation is provided here. Canadian law students learn early 
in their studies that the Parliament of Canada and the Provincial Legislatures each have 
the power to make laws in areas that fall within their jurisdiction6 and that Canadian 
provinces have jurisdiction in the area of property and civil rights.7 Students also learn 
that for reasons related to Canada’s colonial history and to its constitutional 
make-up, matters falling within the area of property and civil rights are based on 
4. Ibid at s 8.1.
5. Many texts are available online, see Department of Justice of Canada, About Bijuralism, 
online: Canadian Legislative Bijuralism <http://www.justice.gc.ca/fra/bijurilex/index.html>. 
Among the primary sources available on this website, see e.g. Department of Justice of 
Canada, ed, The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of 
Quebec and Canadian Bijuralism, 2d  ed, (Ottawa: Minister of Justice and Attorney General 
of Canada, 2001) [DOJ, Harmonization of Federal Legislation] (published in nine booklets); 
Department of Justice of Canada, ed, The Harmonization of Federal Legislation with Quebec 
Civil Law and Canadian Bijuralism: Collection of Studies (Ottawa: Department of Justice 
of Canada, 1997) [DOJ, Collection of Studies]; Jean-Maurice Brisson & André Morel, 
“Droit fédéral et droit civil: complémentarité, dissociation” (1996) 75:2 Can Bar Rev 
297; Jean-Maurice Brisson, “L’impact du Code civil du Québec sur le droit fédéral : une 
problématique” (1992) 52:2 R du B 345.
6. See Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, ss 91, 92 reprinted in RSC 1985, App 
II, No 5.
7. Ibid, s 92(13).
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the civil law in Quebec and on the common law in the other Canadian provinces 
(and the three territories).8 
As discussed in a previous article,9 it often happens that federal legislation 
is not complete because it does not express all the applicable law. In such 
circumstances, underlying provincial property and civil rights concepts can serve 
to supplement federal legislation. For example, in the absence of a definition 
in a federal statute, a reference to the term “secured creditor” will constitute a 
reference to the term as it is understood in the provinces.10 The same is true 
for a reference in a federal statute to “property held in trust” or, more simply, a 
reference to “property.” It is also possible for federal legislation to refer to private 
law concepts by means of neutral or non-legal language (for example, the terms 
activity/activités or distribute/distribuer).11
When federal legislation refers either directly or indirectly to underlying 
private law concepts, a relationship of complementarity is said to exist. Conversely, 
if federal legislation excludes the application of private law, the former is said to 
be dissociated from the latter. Dissociation will occur, for example, where as a 
matter of public policy there is a need to ensure uniform application of federal 
legislation throughout Canada and reliance on private law rules would not 
achieve that result. The dissociation is partial if the legislation adopts common 
law concepts rather than civil law concepts (or vice versa). The dissociation is 
total if the legislation is independent from the law of all of the provinces. This 
may occur, for example, if the legislation forms a complete code or incorporates a 
rule based on a source other than common or civil law, such as international law.
When courts are called upon to interpret federal enactments that appear to 
rely on concepts derived from the field of property and civil rights, they may be 
faced with a dilemma: how to interpret the legislation if the underlying Quebec 
civil law and Canadian common law concepts produce different results.12 Since 
the enactment is applicable to Canada as a whole, courts naturally seek to adopt 
a uniform interpretation. Before section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act was enacted, 
8. See e.g. Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, vol 1, 5th ed, loose-leaf (consulted on 
15 February 2013), (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) at 2.1-2.6.
9. See Aline Grenon, “The Interpretation of Bijural or Harmonized Federal Legislation: 
Schreiber v. Canada (A.G.)” (2005) 84:1 Can Bar Rev 131 at 134-135 [Grenon, 
“Interpretation”].
10. See e.g. Re Giffen, [1998] 1 SCR 91 at paras 60-67, 155 DLR (4th) 322.
11. Louise Wellington, “Bijuralism in Canada: Harmonization Methodology and Terminology” 
in DOJ, Harmonization of Federal Legislation, supra note 5, booklet 4 [Wellington, 
“Bijuralism in Canada”].
12. Variations can also occur among the common law provinces, although this is not as frequent.
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courts often adopted uniform interpretations based on common law concepts.13 
As stated in the introduction, this practice was the subject of criticism because 
the introduction in Quebec of common law concepts gave rise to serious 
reconciliation issues and impaired the integrity of Quebec civil law.14 Nothing 
indicates that critics objected to the principle of uniform application of federal 
legislation; what they criticized was the systematic use of concepts drawn from the 
common law to achieve this result, given the problems that this created in Quebec’s 
civil law system.
The wholesale reform of Quebec civil law in the latter part of the 20th 
century15 provided an ideal opportunity for the federal government to review and 
amend federal legislation in order to facilitate harmonization, where applicable, 
between federal legislation and provincial law.16 It was in this context that section 
8.1 was enacted.
After this brief survey of the main reasons underlying the adoption of section 8.1 
of the Interpretation Act we can turn our attention to the section itself, which reads:
8.1 Both the common law and the civil law are equally authoritative and recognized 
sources of the law of property and civil rights in Canada and, unless otherwise pro-
vided by law, if in interpreting an enactment it is necessary to refer to a province’s 
rules, principles or concepts forming part of the law of property and civil rights, 
13. See e.g. ITO-Int’l Terminal Operators v Miida Electronics, [1986] 1 SCR 752, 28 DLR (4th) 
641, in which the Court held that Canadian maritime law, as adopted from England, rests 
on common law principles, and that maritime law applied in a case involving articles carried 
by sea to Montreal, Quebec that were stored in a warehouse located at the Port of Montreal 
pending delivery, and stolen from that warehouse. Canadian maritime law has a wide reach 
and this has given rise to problems elsewhere in Canada. See e.g. Ordon Estate v Grail, [1998] 
3 SCR 437, 40 OR (3d) 639. But unlike the situation in Quebec, the legal concepts are at 
least familiar.
14. See the sources in supra note 2.
15. See e.g. Sylvio Normand, “An Introduction to Quebec Civil Law” in Aline Grenon & Louise 
Bélanger-Hardy, eds, Elements of Quebec Civil Law: A Comparison with the Common Law of 
Canada (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2008) [Elements of Quebec Civil Law] 25 at 42-47.
16. It also became apparent during that process that harmonization went beyond the dichotomy 
of French civil law and English common law. There is a large Anglophone population in 
Quebec that requires English civil law terminology. There are also substantial Francophone 
populations in the common law regions of Canada that require common law terminology 
in French. In order to ensure that federal legislation be accessible to these four groups, the 
harmonization process became more inclusive: Harmonized federal legislation now seeks 
to ensure that these four Canadian audiences can access federal legislation in the official 
language of their choice and find terminology and concepts that are appropriate to the legal 
system of their province or territory. See e.g. DOJ, Harmonization of Federal Legislation, supra 
note 5; see also Grenon, “Interpretation,” supra note 9.
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reference must be made to the rules, principles and concepts in force in the province 
at the time the enactment is being applied.
8.1 Le droit civil et la common law font pareillement autorité et sont tous deux 
sources de droit en matière de propriété et de droits civils au Canada et, s’il est 
nécessaire de recourir à des règles, principes ou notions appartenant au domaine 
de la propriété et des droits civils en vue d’assurer l’application d’un texte dans une 
province, il faut, sauf règle de droit s’y opposant, avoir recours aux règles, principes 
et notions en vigueur dans cette province au moment de l’application du texte.17
Section 8.1 begins with a statement affirming the equal authority of the 
common law and civil law in the field of property and civil rights and states 
that federal enactments based on rules and concepts that are part of the law of 
property and civil rights in the province are to be interpreted in accordance with 
these rules and concepts. However, section 8.1 also includes two exceptions: 1) 
the possibility that the law may provide otherwise (“unless otherwise provided by 
law/sauf règle de droit s’y opposant”); and 2) the requirement that reference must 
be made to the rules, principles and concepts forming part of the law of property 
and civil rights only “if . . . it is necessary/s’il est nécessaire” to do so.
Even before its adoption it was clear that section 8.1 of the Interpretation 
Act could give rise to a non-uniform application of federal legislation. André 
Morel, closely involved in the work leading up to the adoption of this legislation, 
commented on one of the drafts of the section as follows: 
It may be opportune to assert the principle, which has until now remained implicit, 
that the private law of each province constitutes the fundamental law of any federal 
legislation dealing with matters of private law. Clearly, as we have seen, this principle 
can be set aside many ways. Nonetheless, the interpretative provision considered 
here could be drafted to take this into account. …
What drawback would there be in explicitly stating what is otherwise accepted and 
in accordance with prevailing and consistent judicial decisions? In fact, there would 
be clear advantages. In addition to clarifying the situation, it would force recogni-
tion of the fact that, subject to express derogation or necessary implication, the ap-
plication of federal legislation is not necessarily uniform in all respects throughout 
Canada, and that this diversity is acceptable as a consequence of federalism itself.18
17. Section 8.2 of the Interpretation Act, supra note 3, to which only incidental reference is made 
in this article, states that if an enactment contains terms taken from the two legal traditions, 
the terminology suited to the civil law is to be adopted in Quebec and the common law 
terminology is to be adopted in the other provinces.
18. “The Revision of Federal Legislation in Light of the Civil Code of Quebec: Methodology and 
Work Plan” in DOJ, Collection of Studies, supra note 5, 267 at 304-05.
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The premise that the law of each province in relation to property and civil 
rights supplements federal enactments relating to such matters is accepted by 
many authors19 and (to borrow the words of Morel) “prevailing and consistent 
judicial decisions” are to this effect.20 The possibility has been raised, however, 
that Parliament might have access to “an unenacted body of private law rules 
applicable as federal law to all matters falling within federal jurisdiction.”21 Such 
jurisdiction would allow Parliament to oust provincial law in favour of federal law. 
Accordingly, federal legislation that at first sight appears to be based on provincial 
laws of property and civil rights could actually be based on hypothetical federal 
private law rules, the precise nature of which remains unclear. This hypothetical 
federal private law would allow federal legislation to apply uniformly across Canada.
Whether or not such rules exist, one fundamental point is uncontrover-
sial: Parliament may by legislation exclude the application of provincial private 
law within its own fields of jurisdiction. The inclusion of the “unless otherwise 
provided by law/sauf règle droit s’y opposant” exception in section 8.1 of the 
Interpretation Act expressly recognizes this possibility. Accordingly, if Parliament 
wishes to exclude the application of provincial law, it is not necessary for it to rely 
19. See e.g. Peter W Hogg, Joanne E Magee & Jinyan Li, Principles of Canadian Income Tax 
Law, 8th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) at 9-10; Philippe Denault, La recherche d’unité 
dans l’interprétation du droit privé fédérale: Cadre juridique et fragments du discours judiciaire 
(Montréal: Éditions Thémis, 2008) at 1-62; Leclair, “L’interface entre le droit,” supra 
note 2 at 37-38; Jean Leclair, “Réflexions sur les problèmes constitutionnels soulevés par 
l’abrogation du Code civil du Bas Canada” (1996-97) 99:2 R du N 155 at 185-97; Jacob S 
Ziegel, “Personal Property Security and Bankruptcy: There is no War!” (1993) 72 Can Bar 
Rev 44:1 at 46-47, 50.
20. Supra note 18. See e.g. Re Giffen, supra note 10 at paras 64-66. An SCC decision delivered 
before section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act, supra note 3 came into effect and based on 
the premise that provincial private law can supplement federal legislation. See also Bank 
of Montreal v Innovation Credit Union, 2010 SCC 47 at paras 30-32, [2010] 3 SCR 3 
[Innovation Credit Union]. A decision delivered subsequently and based on the same premise.
21. Roderick A Macdonald, “Encoding Canadian Civil Law” in DOJ, Collection of Studies, 
supra note 5 at 173-90; see also Robert Leckey, “Rhapsodie sur la forme et le fond de 
l’harmonisation juridique” (2010) 51:1 C de D 3 at 28-34. Sullivan also seeks to distance 
herself, at least partly, from the premise that federal legislation should be supplemented by 
provincial private law. See Ruth Sullivan, “The Challenges of Interpreting Multilingual, 
Multijural Legislation” (2004) 29:3 Brook J Int’l L 985 at 1042-43 [Sullivan, “Challenges”].
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on the hypothetical existence of federal private law. It need only state its intention 
in the enactment.22
The essential question then is: In what circumstances may one conclude that 
the Parliament of Canada excluded provincial private law in federal legislation? 
This is a matter of interpretation, and interpreting Canadian federal legislation 
is no easy task. Before the enactment of section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act, a 
number of rules were available, including those relating to the interpretation of 
bilingual legislation.23 But all of these rules are subject to an overarching principle 
of statutory interpretation, summarized famously by Driedger in 1983: “Today 
there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read 
in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously 
with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act and the intention of Parliament.”24
The adoption of section 8.1 necessarily gave rise to questions relating not 
only to the section’s ambit, but also to its interaction with other rules and with 
Driedger’s principle. Although the SCC has yet to analyze section 8.1 in detail, 
a number of authors have done so.25 Three authors in particular (Sullivan, 
Denault, and Molot) have examined section 8.1 in great depth,26 reaching the 
following conclusions:
22. See Macdonald, supra note 21 at 190. Macdonald acknowledges that: 
[E]ven assuming the need for a distinctive federal suppletive law in certain matters, it is open 
to doubt whether the enactment of a federal ius commune is the best way to achieve this end. 
Should the federal Parliament truly wish to insulate certain fields of law, certain statutes or 
even certain sections of statutes from the provincial ius commune, experience suggests that it 
will be most successful if it precisely identifies, for each circumstance, the legal regime it seeks 
to make applicable.
23. See e.g. The Honourable Mr. Justice Michel Bastarache et al, The Law of Bilingual 
Interpretation (Montréal: LexisNexis, 2008).
24. Elmer A Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2d ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 87; see 
also Stéphane Beaulac & Pierre-André Côté, “Driedger’s ‘Modern Principle’ at the Supreme 
Court of Canada: Interpretation, Justification, Legitimization” (2006) 40:1 RJT 131.
25. Sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act, have been the subject of comment in numerous 
texts. See e.g. Pierre-André Côté, Stéphane Beaulac & Mathieu Devinat, The Interpretation 
of Legislation in Canada, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) [Interpretation of Legislation]; 
Leckey, supra note 21; Aline Grenon, “Le bijuridisme canadien à la croisée des chemins? 
Réflexions sur l’incidence de l’article 8.1 de la Loi d’interprétation” (2011) 56:4 McGill LJ 
775 [Grenon, “Bijuridisme canadien”]; Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 
5th ed (Canada: LexisNexis, 2008) at 121-42 [Sullivan, Construction of Statutes]; Denault, 
supra note 19; Grenon, “Interpretation,” supra note 9; Sullivan, “Challenges,” supra note 21 
at 1045-54; Henry L Molot, “Clause 8 of Bill S-4: Amending the Interpretation Act” in DOJ, 
Harmonization of Federal Legislation, supra note 5, booklet 6 at 12-19.
26. See Grenon, “Bijuridisme canadien,” supra note 25 at 781-90 (for a detailed review of the 
analysis adopted by these authors; an English translation is available on request).
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1. a court having to interpret federal legislation must first determine if 
it is necessary to refer to provincial law;27
2. the court may conclude that it is necessary to refer to provincial law 
only after undertaking a detailed analysis of the legislative provision, 
applying inter alia Driedger’s principle;28
3. if applicable, the court should also take into account the exception 
“unless otherwise provided by law/sauf règle de droit s’y opposant”;29
4. although there are questions about the purpose and scope of this 
exception, all three authors agree that it includes provisions that 
expressly exclude provincial law.30
In short, absent an express legislative provision excluding the application 
of provincial law, a court must determine, using a contextual analysis, whether 
or not the enactment to be interpreted necessarily relies on property and civil 
rights concepts. If the answer is no, the court need not rely on provincial law. 
If, however, the court concludes that the enactment relies on property and civil 
rights concepts, it then becomes necessary to take into consideration the relevant 
concepts. The interaction between rules of interpretation relating to bilingual 
statutes and rules relating to bijural legislation has not, however, been the subject 
of extensive comment by these authors.
Since the adoption of section 8.1, the SCC has on several occasions interpreted 
federal statutes involving the possible application of provincial law. Has the SCC 
reached conclusions similar to those of the authors, regarding section 8.1 of the 
Interpretation Act? Has section 8.1 checked the tendency of the courts to adopt an 
interpretation that results in a uniform application of federal legislation based on 
common law concepts? Is it possible to identify certain trends in the application 
of this section? The following section attempts to answer these questions.
III. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA AND SECTION 8.1
Analysis of relevant SCC decisions since 2001 demonstrates that the Court 
has an ambivalent rapport with section 8.1. In particular, the section has not 
yet been the subject of in-depth jurisprudential analysis. In some cases the 
SCC failed to refer to the section altogether, even though a reference would 
27. Denault, supra note 19 at 77-78; Sullivan, Construction of Statutes, supra note 25 at 137; ibid 
at 782-84 [emphasis added].
28. Denault, supra note 19 at 77-78; Sullivan, Construction of Statutes, supra note 25 at 137; ibid 
at 782-84.
29. Interpretation Act, supra note 3, s 8.1; Denault, supra note 19 at 93-94; Molot, supra note 25 
at 18-19; Sullivan, Construction of Statutes, supra note 25 at 142; ibid at 786-88.
30. Ibid at 786-90.
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have been appropriate. Additionally, Anglophone judges appear more prone to 
ignore or minimize the importance of the section, whereas Francophone judges 
(irrespective of their civil law or common law backgrounds) are more likely to 
refer to it. 
A. THE COURT CONSIDERS SECTION 8.1—SCHREIBER, WISE, AND DIMS
Following the adoption of section 8.1, the SCC’s decision in Schreiber v Canada 
(AG)31 was the first in which the Court was called upon to interpret a bijural 
provision, specifically the harmonized version of section 6(a) of the State 
Immunity Act.32 A German court had issued a warrant for the arrest of Schreiber, 
a Canadian citizen, for tax evasion and other offences, and Germany requested 
that Canada extradite him under the provisions of the extradition treaty between 
the two countries. Schreiber was arrested and spent several days in prison until 
released on bail. He commenced an action against Germany and the federal 
government in Ontario seeking damages for personal injuries suffered as a result 
of his arrest and detention. Germany brought a motion to dismiss the action 
against it on the basis that it was immune from the jurisdiction of Canadian 
courts pursuant to the State Immunity Act. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
allowed the motion and its decision was upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
Schreiber then appealed to the SCC. 
In a unanimous judgement delivered by Justice LeBel,33 the SCC dismissed 
Schreiber’s appeal. In the process, it also implicitly approved the Parliament 
of Canada’s bijural federal legislation harmonization process.34 Rather than 
refer specifically to section 8.1, however, the SCC referred instead to the First 
Harmonization Act, whereby sections 8.1 and 8.2 were added to the Interpretation 
31. 2002 SCC 62, [2002] 3 SCR 269 [Schreiber].
32. RSC 1985, c S-18, as harmonized by First Harmonization Act, supra note 3, s 12(1). The 
harmonized section 6(a) provides that:
  6. A foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of a court in any proceeding that  
 relates to
      (a) any death or personal or bodily injury… .
  6. L’État étranger ne bénéficie pas de l’immunité de juridiction dans les actions   
 découlant :
      a) des décès ou dommages corporels survenus au Canada… .
33. Concurred in by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justices Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, 
and Arbour.
34. Schreiber, supra note 31 at paras 66-80.
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Act in 2001.35 In addition, the SCC provided no directions as to the ambit and 
application of section 8.1 and failed to distinguish between the interpretation of 
bilingual and bijural legislation.36
Following Schreiber, the SCC applied section 8.1 expressly or by implication 
in two other decisions. In Peoples Departments Stores Inc (Trustee of ) v Wise,37 
the SCC had to consider subsections 122(1)(a) and (b) of the Canada Business 
Corporations Act (CBCA).38 The decision is significant in several respects. First, 
the SCC does not often have the opportunity to rule on points of corporate law. 
35. See supra note 3.
36. This decision was the subject of two comments relating to the harmonization process and 
to sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act. See Grenon, “Interpretation,” supra note 
9; Sullivan, “Challenges,” supra note 21 at 1045-54. Both authors also commented on the 
confusion in Schreiber between bilingual and bijural rules of interpretation. Sullivan notes 
that “the court confounds the principles governing interpretation of bilingual legislation with 
the principles governing the interpretation of bijural legislation.” (Ibid at 1051). Grenon 
further observes that: 
Justice LeBel appeared to assume the principles governing the interpretation of bilingual and 
bijural provisions are the same. There is, however, an important difference between bilingual 
and bijural legislation. The English and French versions of the Civil Code of Québec and of 
the Business Corporations Act of Ontario are examples of bilingual legislation, but not bijural 
legislation, since each was enacted in the context of a specific legal tradition. They constitute 
bilingual unijural legislation, that is, legislation that is dependent on only one legal tradition. 
In such circumstances, the shared meaning rule is one of the main tools of interpretation. 
The shared meaning rule is also one of the main rules used to interpret federal legislation that 
either does not refer to private law concepts or that overrides them. However, when a court 
is called upon to interpret federal legislation that is both bilingual and bijural, two rules are 
now available. Sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act were added in 2001 by the First 
Harmonization Act precisely to facilitate the interpretation of bijural and harmonized federal 
legislation. 
 Ibid at 141-42.
37. 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 3 SCR 461 [Wise]. 
38. RSC 1985, c C-44 [CBCA]:
122. (1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and discharging 
their duties shall
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation; and
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise 
in comparable circumstances.
122. (1) Les administrateurs et les dirigeants doivent, dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions, 
agir :
a) avec intégrité et de bonne foi au mieux des intérêts de la société;
b) avec le soin, la diligence et la compétence dont ferait preuve, en pareilles 
circonstances, une personne prudente.
(2014) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL514
Second, the issue in Wise concerned the existence and scope of the obligations of 
corporate directors to certain stakeholders, specifically creditors of a corporation 
in financial difficulty. As the SCC noted, this question has attracted the attention 
of courts in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New 
Zealand.39 Accordingly, the judgment was awaited with great impatience. The 
Court handed down a unanimous judgment, with reasons written by Justices 
Major and Deschamps.40
The SCC relied upon section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act to interpret section 
122(1)(b) of the CBCA, and stated:
At the outset, it should be acknowledged that according to art. 300 C.C.Q. and s. 
8.1 … the civil law serves as a supplementary source of law to federal legislation such 
as the CBCA. Since the CBCA does not entitle creditors to sue directors directly for 
breach of their duties, it is appropriate to have recourse to the C.C.Q. to determine 
how rights grounded in a federal statute should be addressed in Quebec, and more 
specifically how s. 122(1) of the CBCA can be harmonized with the principles of 
civil liability… .41
Later, when the SCC further considered the scope of section 122(1)(b) of 
the CBCA, it noted that: 
unlike the statement of the fiduciary duty in s. 122(1)(a) of the CBCA, which 
specifies that directors and officers must act with a view to the best interests of the 
corporation, the statement of the duty of care in s. 122(1)(b) of the CBCA does not 
specifically refer to an identifiable party as the beneficiary of the duty.42
This vacuum led the SCC to conclude, on the basis of section 8.l of the 
Interpretation Act, that there is complementarity between section 122(1)(b) and 
Quebec civil law. The SCC then applied the rules of civil liability in article 1457 
of the Civil Code of Quebec (CCQ) in defining the ambit of section 122(1)(b) of 
the CBCA.
Section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act was not, however, the subject of careful 
analysis in Wise. The SCC did not rely on the interpretive process described in 
Part II of this article. Specifically, the Court did not rely on Driedger’s principle 
and did not conclude, following a contextual analysis of section 122(1)(b) of 
the CBCA, that it was necessary to refer to provincial law. The SCC appears to 
39. Wise, supra note 37 at paras 27, 64.
40. Ibid (Justices Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, and Fish were at the hearing, but Justice 
Iacobucci took no part in the judgment).
41. Wise, supra note 37 at para 29.
42. Ibid at para 57.
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have simply relied on the existence of a vacuum in the provision to justify the 
applicability of Quebec civil law in interpreting section 112(1)(b) of the CBCA. 
In this author’s view, if the SCC had undertaken a comprehensive analysis of this 
provision and examined, among other things, the intention of Parliament, the 
outcome might have been different and might have led the SCC to conclude that 
this duty was owed only to the corporation.
But the SCC did not follow this route. It instead concluded, based on 
subsection 122(1)(b) of the CBCA and article 1457 of the CCQ, that, in certain 
circumstances, the directors of a public corporation created under federal 
legislation may in Quebec have obligations to the corporation’s creditors. Since it is 
not possible to transpose this result elsewhere in Canada, this created uncertainty 
in the common law provinces and territories as to the existence and scope, if any, 
of the liability of the directors to the creditors of the corporation.43
The entire judgment, not just the part relating to section 122(1)(b) of the 
CBCA, had the effect of a bombshell and produced a negative reaction, especially 
in the common law provinces.44 Insofar as the interpretation of section 122(1)(b) 
is concerned, it is tempting to draw a parallel between the reaction in common 
law Canada to the possibility that a civil law approach could apply outside 
Quebec, and the reaction in Quebec when a common law rule is imposed on it. 
Even today, Wise is not clearly understood in the common law provinces, insofar 
as the reference to section 8.1 is concerned.45 
In DIMS Construction inc (Trustee of) v Quebec (AG),46 the SCC once again had 
recourse to section 8.1, albeit indirectly, by reference to the First Harmonization Act. 
In that case, the issue was the interpretation of section 97(3) of the Bankruptcy 
43. See e.g. Bruce Welling, Corporate Law in Canada – The Governing Principles, 3d ed (London, 
Ont: Scribblers, 2006) at 330-31; Christopher C Nicholls, Corporate Law (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 2005) at 299.
44. See e.g. “Symposium on the Supreme Court’s Judgment in the Peoples Department Stores 
Case” (2004-2005) 41 Can Bus LJ 167-246; see also Paul Martel, “L’harmonisation de la Loi 
canadienne sur les sociétés par actions avec le droit civil québécois – Proposition de révision. 
Les devoirs de prudence, de diligence et de compétence des administrateurs de sociétés par 
actions fédérales – impact du Code civil du Québec” (2008) 42 RJT 235 at 282-93, 306-09 
(for an analysis of the part of Wise, supra note 37 that dealt with section 122(1)(b) of the 
CBCA, supra note 38).
45. See e.g. Darcy L MacPherson, “The Legislature Strikes Back: The Effect of Ontario’s Bill 152 
on the Beneficiaries of the Statutory Duty of Care in the Peoples Decision” (2009-2010) 
47:1 Alta L Rev 37; Mohamed F Khimji, “Peoples v. Wise – Conflating Directors’ Duties, 
Oppression and Stakeholder Protection” (2006) UBC L Rev 209 at 217-25. In both of these 
articles the writers appear not to have understood the role section 8.1 of the Interpretation 
Act, supra note 3 played in Wise, supra note 37.
46. 2005 SCC 52, [2005] 2 SCR 564 [DIMS].
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and Insolvency Act (BIA), dealing with the rules of set-off or, as it is known in 
Quebec, compensation.47 Favouring uniformity, the Quebec Court of Appeal 
had in a prior judgment adopted a common law precedent according to which 
the concept of equitable set-off applied in Quebec, insofar as section 97(3) of the 
BIA was concerned.48 In DIMS the SCC considered this approach and handed 
down a unanimous judgment, authored by Justice Deschamps.49 In interpreting 
section 97(3) of the BIA, the Court stated: 
The BIA thus incorporates, although without defining it, a compensation mecha-
nism. To delimit this mechanism, it is necessary to refer not only to the BIA itself, 
but also to provincial law. Since the enactment of the Federal Law–Civil Law Har-
monization Act, No. 1, S.C. 2001, c.  4, it has been clear that in the province of 
Quebec, the civil law of Quebec is the suppletive law in bankruptcy matters.  This 
means that in respect of aspects not governed by the BIA, the civil law rules of com-
pensation apply. What are those rules?50
Since compensation is not defined in the BIA, the SCC relied on Quebec 
civil law (specifically articles 1457, 1672, 1673, and 1681 of the CCQ) in 
applying section 97(3) of the BIA. The SCC did not expressly refer to section 
8.1 of the Interpretation Act, however; it referred only to the First Harmonization 
Act. Further, as in Wise, the SCC did not rely on a contextual interpretation of 
the provision at issue and gave no explanation as to the reason for and purposes 
of section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act. This is unfortunate, since DIMS lent 
itself well to such an exercise. Unlike Wise, in which a contextual analysis might 
have led to a different outcome, a contextual analysis of section 97(3) of the BIA 
47. RSC 1985, c B3 [BIA]. The relevant portions of section 97(3) are as follows:
97. (3) The law of set-off or compensation applies to all claims made against the estate of 
the bankrupt and also to all actions instituted by the trustee for the recovery of debts due to 
the bankrupt in the same manner and to the same extent as if the bankrupt were plaintiff or 
defendant, as the case may be… .
97. (3) Les règles de la compensation s’appliquent à toutes les réclamations produites contre 
l’actif du failli, et aussi à toutes les actions intentées par le syndic pour le recouvrement des 
créances dues au failli, de la même manière et dans la même mesure que si le failli était 
demandeur ou défendeur, selon le cas… .
48. Structal (1982) Inc v Fernand Gilbert ltéé, [1998] RJQ 2686 (QCCA). The Quebec Court of 
Appeal in DIMS resolved the issue on other grounds. See DIMS Construction Inc (Trustee of ) 
v Quebec (AG), [2003] RJQ 1104, 227 DLR (4th) 629 (QCCA).
49. Supra note 46 (concurred in by Justices Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Abella and Charron).
50. DIMS, supra note 46 at para 34.
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would probably have reinforced the SCC’s conclusion, while allowing it to clearly 
explain the raison d’être and ambit of section 8.1.51
Accordingly in DIMS, the SCC did not apply the common law concept 
of equitable set-off in Quebec in connection with section 97(3) of the BIA 
and instead applied Quebec civil law rules. This has led to a variation in the 
application of section 97(3) of the BIA between Quebec and the rest of Canada, 
since equitable set-off is recognized elsewhere in Canada in connection with 
section 97(3) of the BIA.52
In Wise and DIMS the SCC did not hesitate to apply section 8.1, expressly 
or by implication, when called upon to interpret bijural federal legislation. This 
approach may lead to variations in the application of bijural federal legislation 
from one province to another, an issue that is the subject of further comment in 
Part IV of this article.
B. THE COURT MOVES AWAY FROM SECTION 8.1—CANADA 3000, AYSA, 
SAULNIER, AND DRUMMOND
Did the spectre of a non-uniform application of federal legislation, together with 
the very negative reaction to the Wise decision, dampen the enthusiasm of the 
SCC in relation to section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act? The following decisions 
could certainly give rise to such a conclusion.
In Canada 3000 Inc (Re); InterCanadian (1991) Inc (Trustee of ),53 the SCC 
had to interpret federal aeronautics legislation.54 The case involved airlines 
operating fleets of leased aircraft. The airlines became insolvent and defaulted 
51. A contextual analysis might have taken the following into consideration: (1) the lack of any 
definition of the term “set-off or compensation” in the BIA; (2) the fact it was unlikely, in 
view of the British origins of BIA, that the Parliament of Canada specifically intended to rely 
on the concept of equitable set-off  in a bankruptcy context, throughout Canada; (3) the 
harmonization of section 97(3) of the BIA (see Harmonization Act, No 2, SC 2004, c 25, s 
38 [Second Harmonization Act]); (4) the criticism of equitable set-off in connection with the 
BIA. See John AM Judge & Margaret E Grottenhaler, “Legal and Equitable Set-Offs” (1991) 
70:1 Can Bar Rev 91 at 117.
52. See e.g. Holt v Telford, [1987] 2 SCR 193; Husky Oil Operations Ltd v MNR of Canada, 
[1995] 3 SCR 453. See also Ontario (Worker’s Compensation Board) v Mandelbaum, Spergel 
Inc (1993), 12 OR (3d) 385 (Ont CA); Olympia & York Developments Ltd v Royal Trust Co 
(1993), 14 OR (3d) 1, 103 DLR (4th) 129 (Ont Sup Ct); PIA Investments Inc v Deerhurst 
Ltd Partnership (2000), 20 CBR (4th) 116 (Ont CA).
53. 2006 SCC 24, [2006] 1 SCR 865 [Canada 3000].
54. Airport Transfer (Miscellaneous Matters) Act, SC 1992, c 5, s 9 [ATMMA]; Civil Air 
Navigation Services Commercialization Act, SC 1996, c 20, ss 55-56 [CANSCA]; Aeronautics 
Act, RSC 1985, c A2.
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on the payment of charges for airport and civil air navigation services. In two 
separate proceedings, one in Ontario and the other in Quebec, the service 
providers sought authorization to seize and detain the aircraft. The seizures raised 
a number of questions, including whether the service providers could seize the 
aircraft when it was the airlines, not the aircraft owners, who had defaulted. In 
other words, could the owners retake possession of the leased aircraft without 
having to pay the sums owed to the service providers? On appeal from judgments 
delivered by the Ontario55 and Quebec56 Courts of Appeal, the SCC handed 
down a unanimous judgment authored by Justice Binnie.57 
The SCC had to consider the relevance of the CCQ and sections 8.1 and 8.2 
in light of inter alia section 56 of the Civil Air Navigation Services Commercializa-
tion Act (CANSCA).58 At the outset of its analysis, the SCC noted that the case 
was “from first to last an exercise in statutory interpretation and [that] issues of 
interpretation are, as always, closely tied to context.”59 With regard to section 8.1, 
the SCC stated:
55. Greater Toronto Airports Authority v International Lease Finance Corp (2004), 69 OR (3d) 1, 
235 DLR (4th) 618 (Ont CA).
56. Wilmington Trust Co v Inter-Canadien (1991), [2004] RJQ 2966, 247 DLR (4th) 503 
(QCCA).
57. Canada 3000, supra note 53 (Chief Justice McLachlin and Justices Bastarache, LeBel, 
Deschamps, Fish and Charron were present).
58. Supra note 54. The relevant portion of section 56 is as follows:
56(1) In addition to any other remedy available for the collection of an unpaid and overdue 
charge imposed by the Corporation for air navigation services, and whether or not a judgment 
for the collection of the charge has been obtained, the Corporation may apply to the superior 
court of the province in which any aircraft owned or operated by the person liable to pay 
the charge is situated for an order, issued on such terms as the court considers appropriate, 
authorizing the Corporation to seize and detain any such aircraft until the charge is paid or 
a bond or other security for the unpaid and overdue amount in a form satisfactory to the 
Corporation is deposited with the Corporation.
56(1) À défaut de paiement ou en cas de retard de paiement des redevances qu’elle impose 
pour les services de navigation aérienne, la société peut, en sus de tout autre recours visant 
leur recouvrement et indépendamment d’une décision judiciaire à cet égard, demander à la 
juridiction supérieure de la province où se trouve l’aéronef dont le défaillant est propriétaire 
ou usager de rendre, aux conditions que la juridiction estime indiquées, une ordonnance 
l’autorisant à saisir et à retenir l’aéronef jusqu’au paiement des redevances ou jusqu’au dépôt 
d’une sûreté — cautionnement ou autre garantie qu’elle juge satisfaisante — équivalente aux 
sommes dues.
59. Canada 3000, supra note 53 at para 36.
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[T]here is no need to make reference to provincial law … and to do so here is inap-
propriate. Section 56 of CANSCA and s. 9 of the Airports Act specifically state that 
the remedy is to be “in addition to any other remedy[,]” which includes remedies 
under provincial law. The Aeronautics Act, the Airports Act and CANSCA are federal 
statutes that create a unified aeronautics regime. Parliament endeavoured to create 
a comprehensive code applicable across the country and not to vary from one prov-
ince to another. … NAV Canada also relied on ss. 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation 
Act… . However, neither section applies in this case. … If it were necessary to resort 
to provincial law, then the provincial law to be used is that of the province in which 
the provision is being applied… . Here, for reasons stated, resort to provincial law 
is not necessary.60
In Canada 3000, the SCC used the interpretation process described in Part 
II of this article: It first considered whether it was necessary to refer to provincial 
law, and in order to answer that question it undertook a contextual analysis of 
the provisions. In paragraph 78 of its judgment, the SCC also relied on another 
element of this interpretation process, namely, the existence of a rule of law 
excluding the application of provincial law, although the Court did not specifi-
cally refer to the related exception in section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act. The 
SCC’s conclusions are not surprising. They are based on a careful reading of 
section 8.1 and of the relevant legislation, and on contextual analysis.
The same cannot be said for AYSA Amateur Youth Soccer Association v 
Canada (Revenue Agency),61 a decision delivered in 2007. This case arose out of 
an application made by the Amateur Youth Soccer Association (AYSA) to the 
Canada Revenue Agency. The AYSA wished to become a “registered charity” 
within the meaning of section 248(1) of the Income Tax Act (ITA).62 The Agency 
refused to register it as a charity because “the courts have not held the promotion 
of sport to be a charitable purpose.”63 After the Federal Court of Appeal upheld 
the Agency’s decision, AYSA appealed to the SCC. For AYSA to be successful, 
the SCC had to reconsider and overturn precedents. Further, AYSA was faced 
with a major dilemma: Section 248(1) of the ITA gives registered amateur sport 
associations in Canada treatment similar to that of charities, but only if they 
carry on their activities nationally.64 The AYSA, however, functioned exclusively 
in Ontario.
60. Ibid at paras 78-80 [emphasis in original].
61. 2007 SCC 42, [2007] 3 SCR 217 [AYSA].
62. RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) [ITA].
63. Supra note 61 at para 4.
64. Supra note 62.
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Justice Rothstein delivered the majority judgment.65 After concluding that 
the provincial, rather than national, status of the AYSA did not prevent it from 
being recognized as a charity, Justice Rothstein then considered common law 
precedents to determine whether the AYSA could qualify for charitable status. 
Based on these precedents, he concluded that sport was not as such charitable 
in nature.66 He also refused to extend charitable status to amateur youth sports 
organizations because he considered that such recognition would amount 
not to a gradual modification of precedent, but rather to wholesale revision: 
“[S]ubstantial change in the definition of charity must come from the legislature 
rather than the courts.”67
Justice Rothstein dealt with section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act in the context 
of his analysis of the common law. To properly understand his comments it must 
be borne in mind that the Ontario High Court of Justice (Divisional Court) in 
Re Laidlaw Foundation68 had concluded that the promotion of amateur athletic 
sports for physical development purposes fell within the definition of charitable 
purposes in section 6a(a) (now section 7) of the Ontario Charities Accounting 
Act.69 It was on this basis that the AYSA relied on section 8.1 of the Interpreta-
tion Act and argued that the relevant provincial law in Ontario was found in the 
Laidlaw decision.
Justice Rothstein distinguished Laidlaw from decisions holding that sport 
was not a charitable purpose. Perhaps because of this conclusion he also held, in a 
single paragraph and without analysis, that there was no reason to refer to section 
8.1 of the Interpretation Act in the circumstances of the case:
A.Y.S.A. further argues that s. 8.1 of the Interpretation Act … requires the applica-
tion of provincial law to the determination of what is charitable under the ITA and 
that the relevant provincial law in this case can be found in the Laidlaw decision.  
However, specific statutory definitions of charity in provincial legislation and decisions 
dealing with that definition do not dictate the meaning of charity under the ITA.70
Justice Rothstein could have concluded that Laidlaw was only relevant for 
the purposes of a specific Ontario statute and that it did not change the common 
65. Ibid (Chief Justice McLachlin and Justices Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, and 
Charron concurring; Justice Abella delivered a concurring judgment, but relied on reasons 
having nothing to do with section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act).
66. Supra note 61 at para 40.
67. Ibid at para 44.
68. (1984) 13 DLR (4th) 491 at 523, 48 OR (2d) 549 [Laidlaw].
69. RSO 1980, c 65. The definition of charitable purposes is now in Charities Accounting Act 
(RSO 1990, c C.10, s 7).
70. Supra note 61 at para 39 [emphasis added].
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law in Ontario according to which sport as such is not charitable in nature. 
Unfortunately, Justice Rothstein went much further. According to him, “specific 
statutory definitions of charity in provincial legislation and decisions dealing 
with that definition do not dictate the meaning of charity under the ITA.”71 
There is no basis for this statement, since section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act does 
not distinguish between the ITA and other federal statutes. Under section 8.1, 
if it is necessary to refer to the private law of the provinces in order to interpret 
legislation, the provincial law applies, unless otherwise provided by law. Justice 
Rothstein did not make that analysis. He simply brushed aside section 8.1.
A further point must be raised, since it will likely be the subject of future 
litigation. To qualify as a “charitable organization” under the ITA, an organization 
must satisfy the criteria in section 149.1(l)(a) to (d) of the ITA, one of which is 
that the organization must devote its resources to “charitable activities.”72 Since 
the term “charitable activities” is not defined in the ITA, the courts have relied on 
the common law to determine its meaning. Justice Rothstein refers to this fact 
more than once in his judgment,73 with reference to the Court’s earlier decision 
in Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v MNR74 It must 
be noted that the judgment in Vancouver Society was delivered in 1999, before 
section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act came into effect, and that the case arose in 
British Columbia, a common law jurisdiction. In Quebec, however, where the 
social utility trust is the equivalent of the common law charitable trust, article 
1270 of the CCQ defines a social utility trust as “a trust constituted for a purpose 
of general interest, such as a cultural, educational, philanthropic, religious or 
scientific purpose.” 
The scope of the Quebec social utility trust is likely broader than that of 
equivalent common law trusts and this raises several questions. Should a trust 
that satisfies the criteria set out in article 1270 of the CCQ and that applies 
to become a registered charity under section 149.1 of the ITA75 be subject to 
common law rules, rules that have given rise to criticism76 including criticism in 
the majority judgment in Vancouver Society?77 What will happen if the Canada 
71. Ibid.
72. ITA, supra note 62.
73. Ibid at paras 8, 24.
74. [1999] 1 SCR 10, 169 DLR (4th) 34 [Vancouver Society].
75. ITA, supra note 62.
76. See e.g. Blake Bromley, “Contemporary Philanthropy – Is the Legal Concept of  ‘Charity’ 
Any Longer Adequate?” in Donovan W M Waters, ed, Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts – 1993 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1993) at 59.
77. Supra note 74 at paras 201-03.
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Revenue Agency concludes that a Quebec social trust that satisfies Quebec criteria 
does not satisfy common law criteria? In that situation, would recourse to section 
8.1 of the Interpretation Act not be appropriate?78
In short, Justice Rothstein’s comment that section 8.1 does not apply because 
provincial law cannot “dictate the meaning of charity” under the ITA does not 
end the matter. Furthermore, it is not desirable to minimize the importance 
of section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act, an issue that is the subject of further 
comment in Part IV of this article.
In the 2008 case of Saulnier v Royal Bank of Canada,79 the SCC ruled on a 
judgment of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. A fisherman who held four fishing 
licences had given to his bank a general security interest under Nova Scotia’s 
Personal Property Security Act (PPSA)80 in order to finance his fishing business. 
The fisherman subsequently made an assignment of his property under the BIA,81 
but refused to sign an agreement for sale of the four fishing licences, arguing that 
they were not “property” within the meaning of section 2 of the BIA and section 
2(w) of the PPSA. Since such licences have great value, it is not surprising that 
the bankruptcy trustee and the bank turned to the courts.
In a unanimous judgment by Justice Binnie,82 the SCC ruled on the scope of 
the defined terms “property” in the BIA and “intangible property” and “personal 
property” in the PPSA. For the purposes of this article, only the comments 
relating to the BIA are relevant. The BIA defines “property” as follows:
“[P]roperty” means any type of property, whether situated in Canada or elsewhere, 
and includes money, goods, things in action, land and every description of property, 
whether real or personal, legal or equitable, as well as obligations, easements and ev-
ery description of estate, interest and profit, present or future, vested or contingent, 
in, arising out of or incident to property… .
78. See the excellent analysis in Kathryn Chan, “Charitable According to Whom? The Clash 
between Quebec’s Societal Values and the Law Governing the Registration of Charities” 
(2008) 49:2 C de D 277; Kathryn Chan “Taxing Charities / Imposer les organismes de 
bienfaisance: Harmonization and Dissonance in Canadian Charity Law” (2007) 55:3 Can 
Tax J 481 at 489-98.
79. 2008 SCC 58, [2008] 3 SCR 166 [Saulnier].
80. SNS 1995-96, c 13 [PPSA].
81. Supra note 47.
82. Saulnier, supra note 79 (Chief Justice McLachlin and Justices LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, 
Abella, Charron and Rothstein concurring; Justice Bastarache did not participate in the 
judgment).
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« bien » Bien de toute nature, qu’il soit situé au Canada ou ailleurs. Sont com-
pris parmi les biens les biens personnels et réels, en droit ou en equity, les sommes 
d’argent, marchandises, choses non possessoires et terres, ainsi que les obligations, 
servitudes et toute espèce de domaines, d’intérêts ou de profits, présents ou futurs, 
acquis ou éventuels, sur des biens, ou en provenant ou s’y rattachant… .83
Justice Binnie reviewed various interpretive approaches from Canadian 
jurisprudence. Turning to the definition of “property” in section 2 of the BIA, 
he wrote: 
The terms of the definition are very wide. Parliament unambiguously signalled an 
intention to sweep up a variety of assets of the bankrupt not normally considered 
“property” at common law.  This intention should be respected if the purposes of 
the BIA are to be achieved.
…
I prefer to look at the substance of what was conferred, namely a licence to partici-
pate in the fishery coupled with a proprietary interest in the fish caught according 
to its terms and subject to the Minister’s regulation.   As noted earlier, the BIA is 
intended to fulfill certain objectives in the event of a bankruptcy which require, in 
general, that non-exempt assets be made available to creditors. The s. 2 definition 
of property should be construed accordingly to include a s. 7(1) fishing licence.84
The SCC thus seems to have adopted an approach consistent with section 
8.1 of the Interpretation Act, but without referring to the section. First, the SCC 
interpreted a provision in a federal statute applicable in a common law province. 
Second, the wording of the provision did not provide a solution to the dispute and, 
in addition, the provision clearly referred to property and civil rights concepts. 
Third, there was no express rule of law against the use of such concepts. The SCC 
concluded that Parliament had clearly signalled its intention to include a variety 
of the bankrupt’s assets not normally considered “property” at common law. Does 
this mean that, if the SCC had referred to section 8.1 in Saulnier, it would have 
concluded that it was not necessary to have recourse to provincial common law, since 
the intention of Parliament in section 2 of the BIA was clear? Another question 
also arises. In view of the SCC’s silence regarding section 8.1 in Saulnier, are we to 
conclude that section 8.1 only applies when the case rests on Quebec civil law and 
that there is no need to refer to it when the case rests on Canadian common law? 
Nothing in the wording of section 8.1 indicates this—quite the contrary.
83. BIA, supra note 47, s 2.
84. Saulnier, supra note 79 at paras 44, 46.
(2014) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL524
Finally, in Caisse populaire Desjardins de l’Est de Drummond v Canada85 a 
secured creditor, the Caisse Populaire Desjardins de l’Est de Drummond, granted 
a line of credit to a debtor. A few days later, the debtor deposited a sum of money 
with the Caisse in the form of term savings. The agreements between the Caisse 
and the debtor stipulated that in the event of a failure by the debtor to repay 
the Caisse, there would be set-off between the sums owing to the Caisse and 
the deposit. The debtor defaulted and subsequently made an assignment of his 
property under the BIA.86 The Caisse retained the deposit. 
Litigation arose between the Caisse and the Crown because the debtor had 
not remitted income tax and employment insurance premiums deducted from its 
employees’ salaries to the Crown. Sections 227(4.1) of the ITA87 and 86(2.1) of 
the Employment Insurance Act (EIA)88 create deemed trusts in favour of the Crown 
over the property of an employer who makes such deductions, up to the amount 
of the unremitted deductions. These trusts apply to the employer’s property and 
also to property held by a secured creditor that, but for the security interest, 
would be property of the employer. By means of these trusts, the Crown sought 
to reach the money deposited with the Caisse.
Since the relevant provisions of the ITA and the EIA are similar, this analysis 
will focus only on the ITA. Section 227(4.1) of the ITA states that the deemed 
trust shall include property held by secured creditors “as defined in subsection 
224(1.3)” of the ITA that “but for a security interest (as defined in subsection 
224(1.3) [of the ITA] would be property” of the employer, and that the deemed 
trust applies “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this Act … any other 
enactment of Canada, any enactment of a province or any other law… .”89 
Section 224(1.3) of the ITA defines “security interest/garantie”:
“[S]ecurity interest” means any interest in property that secures payment or per-
formance of an obligation and includes an interest created by or arising out of a 
debenture, mortgage, hypothec, lien, pledge, charge, deemed or actual trust, assign-
ment or encumbrance of any kind whatever, however or whenever arising, created, 
deemed to arise or otherwise provided for… .
« garantie » Droit sur un bien qui garantit l’exécution d’une obligation, notamment 
un paiement. Sont en particulier des garanties les droits nés ou découlant de dében-
85. 2009 SCC 29, [2009] 2 SCR 94 [Drummond].
86. Supra note 47.
87. Supra note 62. 
88. SC 1996, c 24 [EIA].
89. ITA, supra note 62.
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tures, hypothèques, privilèges, nantissements, sûretés, fiducies réputées ou réelles, 
cessions et charges, quelle qu’en soit la nature, de quelque façon ou à quelque date 
qu’elles soient créées, réputées exister ou prévues par ailleurs.90
The main issue in Drummond was whether the contractual right of set-off 
created in favour of the Caisse was a “security interest” within the meaning of 
section 224(1.3) of the ITA. If so, the Crown could reach the deposit. This issue 
gave rise to two dramatically different judgments, that of Justice Rothstein for 
the majority91 and that of Justice Deschamps for the minority.92 Not only were the 
judgments different, but each judge expressed in no uncertain terms disagreement 
with the approach taken by the other.
Justice Rothstein concluded that, for the purposes of the definition of 
“security interest” under section 224(1.3) of the ITA, provincial law regarding 
property and civil rights was not relevant for three reasons: (1) the phrase 
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this Act . . . any other enactment of 
Canada, any enactment of a province or any other law” in section 227(4.1) of 
the ITA, was incorporated by reference in the definition of a security interest; (2) 
federal Parliament has a right to adopt its own definitions in areas falling within 
its jurisdiction, without having to take provincial law into account; and (3) 
Parliament’s intention that it should be able to act uniformly throughout Canada 
in recovering money owed to Her Majesty.93 Based on these conclusions, Justice 
Rothstein then discussed the meaning of the definition of “security interest/
garantie” in section 224(1.3) of the ITA. Relying on the first part of the definition 
(“interest in property that secures payment or performance of an obligation”94), 
he opined that:
so long as the creditor’s interest in the debtor’s property secures payment or per-
formance of an obligation, there is a “security interest” within the meaning of this 
section. While Parliament has provided a list of “included” examples, these examples 
do not diminish the broad scope of the words “any interest in property.”95 
On the question of whether this definition covers set-off, Justice Rothstein 
stated that a contractual right of set-off can in some circumstances fall within this 
definition: In his opinion, one should carefully consider the terms of the contract 
90. Ibid.
91. Supra note 85 (concurred in by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justices Binnie, Fish, Charron, 
and Rothstein).
92. Ibid (concurred in by Justice LeBel).
93. Ibid at paras 8-17.
94. ITA, supra note 62, s 224(1.3).
95. Drummond, supra note 85 at para 15.
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“to determine whether the parties intended to confer on one party or the other 
‘any interest in property [of the other party] that secures payment or performance 
of an obligation.’”96 After reviewing the terms of the contract, Justice Rothstein 
concluded that they expressly gave the Caisse a right over the debtor’s deposit as 
security for the repayment of the money owed by the debtor and that the right 
was accompanied by specific limitations in favour of the Caisse.97 The combined 
effect of the right of set-off and of the limitations was that the Caisse had a right 
over the debtor’s deposit that secured performance of the debtor’s obligations. 
Justice Rothstein also stated that, according to the wording of the agreements, 
the Caisse had considered that the debtor was providing security for the monies 
owed to the Caisse.98 He accordingly concluded that a security interest existed 
within the meaning of section 224(1.3) of the ITA.
Justice Rothstein made no mention of section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act, 
despite the fact that section 8.1 allowed him to conclude that an express rule of 
law excluded recourse to provincial law in determining the scope of a “security 
interest” under section 224(1.3) of the ITA. The application of section 8.1 would 
also have allowed him to conclude, following a contextual analysis, that it was 
not necessary to have recourse to Quebec civil law. The absence of any reference 
to section 8.1 is all the more surprising, given that Justice Deschamps referred to 
the section in her judgment.
At the start of her minority judgment, Justice Deschamps stated:
It should be noted that there is no distinct federal common law… . Where the sup-
pletive law must be applied to interpret a concept incorporated into a federal rule, 
the law of the province is the relevant source: Federal Law—Civil Law Harmoniza-
tion Act, No. 1, S.C. 2001, c. 4, s. 8, amending the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 
I21. As a result, absent an express provision to the contrary, federal legislation must 
be interpreted in a manner consistent with the concepts and institutions of the legal 
system of the province in which it is to be applied… .99
Though indirect, this reference to section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act might 
lead the reader to think that Justice Deschamps’ judgment was based on that 
particular rule of interpretation. However, section 8.1’s role was ambiguous, since 
96. Ibid at para 23.
97. Ibid at paras 29-30.
98. Ibid at para 31.
99. Ibid at para 81. It should be noted that in this paragraph, Justice Deschamps fails to refer 
to the possibility that it might not be necessary for a court to rely upon property and civil 
law concepts; she only refers to the possibility that there could be an express provision in the 
enactment excluding such concepts. She does however refer very briefly to the question of 
necessity in the following paragraph.
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Justice Deschamps later stated that “not only must reference be made—when 
necessary to interpret federal legislation—to the law of the province in which it 
is to be applied, but both the English and French versions must be taken into 
consideration.”100 She opined that an analysis of the French and English versions 
is necessary to determine whether a common meaning of the words “security 
interest” and “garantie” under section 224(1.3) of the ITA can be established. 
Justice Deschamps added that in the case at bar, this analysis leads to a notion 
common to the civil and the common law that “makes it possible to harmonize 
the application of the taxing provision in the two legal systems.”101 Later, she 
referred directly to sections 8.1, but in the context of the shared meaning rule 
of interpretation.102
Finally, in the part of her judgment in which she expressed disagreement 
with Justice Rothstein’s approach, Justice Deschamps wrote: “Since his approach 
does not correspond at all to the shared meaning, its effect is to disregard both 
the principles applicable to the interpretation of bilingual legislation and those 
applicable to the harmonization of federal law and provincial law.”103 
In short, Justice Deschamps made no clear distinction between the rules 
of interpretation relating to bijural legislation and those relating to bilingual 
legislation. She appears to have skipped over the former and proceeded 
immediately to the latter. If Justice Deschamps had made a clear distinction 
between the two and had used the interpretation process described in Part II of 
this article, she would have first asked the following two questions: Is it necessary 
to make use of section 8.1? Does a rule of law exist against applying section 
8.1? In view of the phrase “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this Act, 
… any other enactment of Canada, any enactment of a province or any other 
law…” contained in section 227(4.1) of the ITA, a section that specifically refers 
to section 224(1.3), there appears to be at the very least a rule against applying 
section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act and provincial law. Since the crucial point is 
to interpret section 224(1.3) of the ITA, the phrase is of utmost importance. The 
absence in the minority judgment of any reference to the phrase is puzzling, as is 
the absence in the majority judgment of any reference to section 8.1, particularly 
since such a reference would have supported the majority judgment.
Of these four decisions, only in Canada 3000 does the SCC analyze 
section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act in some detail. In the main AYSA, Saulnier, 
and Drummond judgments, section 8.1 is either dismissed (AYSA) or ignored 
100. Ibid at para 82.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid at para 86.
103. Ibid at para 112.
(2014) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL528
(Saulnier and the majority judgment of Justice Rothstein in Drummond). Only 
Justice Deschamps and Justice Lebel consider section 8.1 in passing in their 
minority judgment in Drummond. In none of these three cases is section 8.1 
applied or carefully analyzed, giving rise to the concern that the SCC is giving 
the section short shrift. This concern is, however, partially dispelled in three 
subsequent decisions.
C. THE COURT RETURNS TO SECTION 8.1—INNOVATION CREDIT UNION, 
RADIUS CREDIT UNION
Bank of Montreal v Innovation Credit Union104 and Royal Bank of Canada v Radius 
Credit Union105 involved financing granted by the Bank of Montreal and the 
Royal Bank of Canada, secured pursuant to the Bank Act.106 The debtors defaulted 
and the banks seized the secured property, only to discover that Innovation 
Credit Union and Radius Credit Union had obtained prior security on the same 
property pursuant to The Personal Property Security Act, 1993 (PPSA, 1993)107 of 
the province of Saskatchewan. However, the security agreements had not been 
registered under the PPSA, 1993. This gave rise to a priority dispute between the 
banks and the credit unions.
The two unanimous judgments, delivered by Justice Charron, dealt with the 
thorny and controversial relationship between Bank Act security on the one hand, 
and on the other, security interests obtained in accordance with personal property 
legislation in effect in the common law provinces.108 To resolve the dispute, the 
Court resorted to section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act. 
In Innovation Credit Union, the SCC held firstly, that the Bank Act contained 
no priority rules to resolve the conflict arising when an interest in property is 
acquired by a third party before the property becomes subject to the bank’s 
security; and secondly, that the security regime contained in the Bank Act is 
104. Supra note 20 (this was a unanimous judgment delivered by Justice Charron; Chief Justice 
McLachlin and Justices Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Rothstein, and Cromwell 
concurred).
105. 2010 SCC 48, [2010] 3 SCR 38 [Radius Credit Union] (once again, this was a unanimous 
judgment delivered by Justice Charron and concurred in by the same judges as ibid).
106. SC 1991, c 46.
107. SS 1993, c P-6.2 [PPSA, 1993].
108. Supra note 106. The relationship between federal bank security and provincial personal 
property security interests has given rise to numerous conflicts. See Innovation Credit Union, 
supra note 20, at para 1. The Law Commission of Canada has recommended the repeal of 
the Bank Act security regime. See Law Commission of Canada, Modernizing Canada’s Secured 
Transactions Law: The Bank Act Security Provisions (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 
2004) at 30.
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property-based. The SCC accordingly concluded that the dispute should be 
resolved in accordance with property law, a provincial field of jurisdiction.109 The 
Court also stated: 
While the provinces cannot legislate in order to oust the bank’s rights, they can alter 
the law as it relates to property and civil rights in each province. … Thus in deter-
mining the nature of any competing provincial security interest, resort has to be 
made to the relevant provincial statute and the Bank Act has to be read in harmony 
with it. This approach is reflected in the preamble of the Federal Law – Civil Law 
Harmonization Act, No. 1, S.C. 2001, c. 4 (the “Harmonization Act”):
WHEREAS the harmonious interaction of federal legislation and provin-
cial legislation is essential and lies in an interpretation of federal legislation 
that is compatible with the common law or civil law traditions, as the case 
may be;
…
WHEREAS the provincial law, in relation to property and civil rights, is 
the law that completes federal legislation when applied in a province, un-
less otherwise provided by law;
Section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act … as amended by s. 8 of the Harmonization Act 
specifically provides for the application of the “rules, principles and concepts in force 
in the province at the time the enactment is being applied.”110
The SCC accordingly concluded that the security interest acquired by the 
credit union, despite not having been registered, nonetheless corresponded to 
a provincial common law proprietary right. The Bank of Montreal also had a 
proprietary right in accordance with the Bank Act security regime. Since the 
issue was a conflict between proprietary rights over the same property, and the 
Bank Act contained no priority rules, common law priority rules applied and the 
proprietary right first obtained, that of the credit union, prevailed. 
In Innovation Credit Union, all the secured property belonged to the 
debtor before he granted security to the credit union. In Radius Credit Union, 
however, the debtor acquired some of the secured property after granting 
security to the bank. However, the first judgment remains the leading case as 
it was used as a basis for the second; the second judgment is accordingly not 
considered at length in this article. 
109. Supra note 20 at para 30.
110. Ibid at para 31. See the full text of the preamble in supra note 3.
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In Innovation Credit Union and Radius Credit Union, the SCC did not 
hesitate to make use of section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act. It is, however, 
simple to rely on the common law to fill gaps in federal legislation, as the 
Court did in these two judgments. It is much more difficult to rely similarly 
on civil law, particularly when doing so gives rise to a non-uniform application 
of federal legislation. The SCC was not faced with this prospect in its latest 
decision, discussed below, but is likely to face it in due course.
D. THE COURT’S LATEST DECISION—QUEBEC AG
The most recent decision in which the SCC considered Section 8.1 was Quebec 
(AG) v Canada (Human Resources and Social Development).111 “B” began receiving 
income replacement benefits from the Quebec Commission de la santé et de la 
sécurité du travail (CSST) following an industrial accident. Pursuant to section 
144 of An Act respecting Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases,112 such 
benefits could not be seized. However, B owed sums to the Canada Employment 
Insurance Commission (CEIC) and pursuant to section 126(4) of the EIA,113 the 
CEIC had the right to seek reimbursement through a simple notice that allowed 
it to, in effect, seize amounts owed to B by third parties. The CEIC sent a notice 
requiring the CSST to pay the income replacement benefits to it, rather than to 
B, and the CSST complied. B challenged the process and the Quebec Superior 
Court ruled in his favour, but was overruled by the Quebec Court of Appeal. 
The Attorney General of Quebec, who appeared in the Court of Appeal as an 
intervener, appealed to the SCC. 
A key issue was the interpretation of conflicting and relevant provincial 
and federal statutory provisions. In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice 
Deschamps114 the SCC held, based on the doctrine of federal paramountcy, 
that the CEIC’s right to obtain reimbursement was not subject to the provincial 
provision respecting exemption from seizure.
The Attorney General of Quebec argued that federal legislation generally 
favours the application of provincial legislation. Relying on section 8.1 of the 
Interpretation Act, he argued that Parliament had consented to the application 
of the provincial rules respecting exemption from seizure, since there was no 
111. 2011 SCC 60, [2011] 3 SCR 635 [Quebec AG].
112. CQLR, c A-3.001.
113. Supra note 88.
114. Quebec AG, supra note 111 (Chief Justice McLachlin and Justices Binnie, Lebel, Deschamps, 
Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstein and Cromwell concurred).
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expressed intention in section 126(4) of the EIA to exclude these rules.115 The 
SCC stated that it was not necessary to refer to provincial law because the wording 
of the EIA provision excluded it, and rejected the section 8.1 argument.116 In 
order to reach its conclusion, the SCC also relied on the legislative context 
demonstrating Parliament’s intention.117 In particular, the SCC compared the 
recovery mechanisms in sections 126(1) and 126(4) of the EIA118 and concluded 
that, while the mechanism in section 126(1) was expressly subject to provincial 
law, the mechanism in section 126(4) was not. The Court stated:
The differences between the procedures provided for in s. 126(1) and s. 126(4) EIA 
become apparent when the two procedures are compared. The procedure under s. 
126(4) is autonomous… . It requires nothing more than the issuance of a notice 
by the Commission, and that notice is sufficient to effect what amounts to garnish-
ment. If Parliament has created two separate procedures, one of which is subject to 
provincial law while the other is not, it must be understood to have intended the 
second procedure to be independent of provincial law. The Commission has been 
granted a freestanding positive right to proceed by way of a requirement to pay 
rather than by way of seizure.119
The SCC’s conclusion regarding section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act was 
warranted. In essence, the Court used the method described in Part II of this 
article: It considered whether it was necessary to refer to provincial law. For this 
purpose, it examined the wording of the relevant provisions and carried out a 
contextual analysis to determine Parliament’s intention. It would however have 
been useful if the SCC had stated clearly that the absence of an express intention 
to exclude provincial law does not, as the Quebec Attorney General had argued, 
imply consent to the application of provincial law. Even in the absence of an 
express provision excluding provincial law, for section 8.1 of the Interpretation 
Act to apply, it must be necessary to rely on provincial law. 
Although this case arose in Quebec, it was not a situation in which a 
contextual analysis led to a non-uniform application of federal legislation. 
The SCC is likely, however, to encounter such a situation in due course and this 
prospect is the subject of further comment in the next Part of this article.
115. Ibid at para 27; EIA, supra note 88.
116. Quebec AG, supra note 111 at para 27.
117. Ibid at paras 28-33.
118. Supra note 88.
119. Ibid at para 32.
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IV. IMPACT (PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE) OF SECTION 8.1
A. PAST AND PRESENT: OBSERVATIONS ACROSS THE SECTION 8.1 
JURISPRUDENCE
The judgments of the SCC commented on in Part III of this article give rise to 
several observations regarding the impact of section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act. 
First, the SCC has not yet subjected section 8.1 to in-depth analysis. Section 8.1 
was not scrutinized carefully in any of the decisions discussed in Part III, and 
none of the judges has attempted to explain clearly its underlying objectives. In 
some cases, there is no express mention of section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act 
and reference is simply made to the First Harmonization Act. The unanimous 
judgment of Justice LeBel in Schreiber and the unanimous judgment of Justice 
Deschamps in DIMS fall into this category.120 In other cases where express or 
implied reference was made to section 8.1, the Court’s analysis was limited; this is 
apparent in the SCC’s unanimous judgments in Wise, Canada 3000, Innovation 
Credit Union, Quebec AG, and in the majority judgment of Justice Rothstein in 
AYSA.121 When the SCC is next called upon to apply section 8.1 of the Interpreta-
tion Act, it should make use of the opportunity to explain clearly the underlying 
objectives of the section. Such an explanation would allow the SCC subsequently 
to make more effective use of section 8.1 and would also allow Canadian lawyers 
as a whole to gain a better understanding of the section.
Second, some of the decisions in Part III of this article make no reference 
to section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act, although they lend themselves to such a 
reference. This is true of the majority judgment in Drummond and the unanimous 
judgment in Saulnier.122 Section 8.1 was undoubtedly argued in Drummond, 
although it may not have been in Saulnier. However, the fact that the section was 
not argued should not prevent the SCC from referring to it. Since it is a rule of 
interpretation contained in a federal statute, the SCC may refer to it ex officio.123
Third, the SCC appears intent on minimizing the importance of section 
8.1 in the AYSA and Drummond decisions. For example, in the AYSA decision 
section 8.1 was brushed aside in a two sentence paragraph.124 This may be due 
120. See Schreiber, supra note 31; DIMS, supra note 46.
121. See Wise, supra note 37; Canada 3000, supra note 53; Innovation Credit Union, supra note 20; 
Quebec AG, supra note 111; AYSA, supra note 61.
122. See Drummond, supra note 85 per Rothstein J; Saulnier, supra note 79 per Binnie J.
123. Canada Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c C-5, s 18.
124. Supra note 61 at para 39.
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to the Court’s valid desire to ensure uniform application of federal legislation 
throughout Canada. But no matter how desirable a uniform result might be, 
judges must take into consideration Parliament’s intention as expressed in section 
8.1 of the Interpretation Act and in the preamble to the First Harmonization 
Act.125 Additionally, when the SCC, consistent with Driedger’s modern principle 
of statutory interpretation,126 undertakes a contextual analysis of the provision 
it is interpreting, that analysis should take into account the importance that the 
Parliament of Canada has placed on bijuralism and on the equal authority of 
the common law and civil law respecting property and civil rights. Quite apart 
from the adoption of sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act, the federal 
government has made enormous efforts in this regard. Examples include the 
creation of the Department of Justice Civil Code Section in 1993 to ensure that 
federal legislation is consistent with the civil law of Quebec;127 the Policy on 
Legislative Bijuralism adopted in 1995;128 the Program for the Harmonization of 
Federal Legislation with the Civil Law of the Province of Quebec in 1997;129 the 
Cabinet Directive on Law-Making;130 and the three harmonization acts adopted 
to date.131 Section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act is now clearly part of Canada’s legal 
landscape and must form part of any contextual analysis. It seems fair to say that 
section 8.1 is an additional factor judges must now consider when relying on 
Driedger’s principle of statutory interpretation.
Fourth, Driedger’s principle gives judges very wide latitude. In this regard, 
Côté, Beaulac, and Devinat have written:
At the present time, it can be said that any element relevant to the establishment 
of the meaning of a statute may be taken into consideration. … The main question 
125. Supra note 3.
126. Construction of Statutes, supra note 24 at 87.
127. Wellington, “Bijuralism in Canada,” supra note 11 at 2, App II.
128. Ibid at 3, App III. The policy is also available online. See Department of Justice, Policies and 
Directives, online: Canadian Legislative Bijuralism <http://www.justice.gc.ca>.
129. Ibid at 3.
130. Canada, Guide to Making Federal Acts and Regulations, 2d ed (Ottawa: Department of Justice 
of Canada, 2000), online: Privy Council Office <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca>. The guide 
states:
It is equally important that bills and regulations respect both the common law and civil law 
legal systems since both systems operate in Canada and federal laws apply throughout the 
country. When concepts pertaining to these legal systems are used, they must be expressed in 
both languages and in ways that fit into both systems.
131. First Harmonization Act, supra note 3; Second Harmonization Act, supra note 51; Federal 
Law–Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 3, SC 2011, c 21.
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which remains, and to which there is no general answer, is: What weight, what au-
thority, what value should the interpreter attribute to the various factors which can 
or must be taken into account?132
In short, it is up to the interpreter to measure and assess these various factors. 
When dealing however with a provision that might be based on provincial law 
and that could give rise to non-uniform application of a federal enactment, might 
some judges be tempted to give more importance to one factor than another? By 
doing this, it might be possible to conclude that the provision for interpretation is 
not based on provincial law. When judges are called upon to interpret legislation, 
they must act impartially. They may not substitute their own wishes for that of 
Parliament: their function is simply to determine what Parliament intended.133 If 
following an impartial contextual analysis there is no intention that the provision 
should have a uniform application, judges have no power to conclude that it should. 
Fifth, in none of the judgments analyzed in Part III, with the possible 
exception of the AYSA decision,134 did the SCC rely on common law concepts to 
conclude that federal legislation applied uniformly. In other words, the SCC did 
not rely on the common law to achieve uniform application of federal legislation 
and impose common law rules in Quebec. Is it possible to conclude that the 
SCC now takes section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act into consideration even 
when it does not refer to the section in its judgments, and that it will use every 
available means to avoid imposing common law rules on Quebec civil law? It 
is still too early to reach this conclusion, but if it proves true, section 8.1 will 
at least have had a beneficial effect. However, it must be borne in mind that 
section 8.1 clearly gives rise to the possibility that some legislation will not have 
uniform application, and judges must take this into consideration. Each time this 
possibility arises, judges should resort to section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act and 
not attempt to circumvent it by relying on interpretation methods that may be of 
dubious applicability in the circumstances of the particular case.
A final observation: It could be legitimate to conclude that section 8.1 of 
the Interpretation Act did not apply in most of the judgments analyzed in Part III 
of this article because, following a contextual analysis, it was not necessary to do 
so or because a rule of law excluded its application. However, such a conclusion 
should be reached as a result of an impartial contextual analysis conducted in 
light of the purposes of section 8.1.135 In cases where this analysis indicates that 
132. Interpretation of Legislation, supra note 25 at 47.
133. See e.g. ibid at 5-6, 90; Denault, supra note 19 at 88-90; Sullivan, Construction of Statutes, 
supra note 25 at 2.
134. AYSA, supra note 61.
135. See e.g. the preamble to the First Harmonization Act, supra note 3.
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the legislative provision rests on provincial law, the courts must not attempt to 
circumvent this result. 
B. FUTURE: COMMENTS AND PROPOSALS TO FOSTER HYBRID LAW
These observations give rise to several comments and proposals. Given the 
wide latitude that judges enjoy, it is relatively easy for them to conclude, based 
on a contextual interpretation, that federal legislation applies uniformly, 
particularly since the advantages of uniform application are obvious. It is 
more difficult to conclude that there is a lack of uniformity. However, such a 
conclusion can give rise to advantages. Although initially a lack of uniformity 
makes the law more complicated, in the medium- or long-term it may have 
positive consequences. 
In 2008, I stated that “DIMS clearly illustrates that differences may arise 
in how federal legislation applies in different provinces as a result of sections 
8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act.”136 I expect that similar decisions will 
arise in the future. Knowledge of both Quebec civil law and Canadian 
common law is essential to analyze and understand such decisions properly. In 
these circumstances, comparison of both legal systems is obviously of practical 
rather than theoretical importance. Obviously, decisions such as DIMS place 
Parliament in a difficult situation.137 In order to preserve the integrity of both 
legal systems, Parliament can simply accept that its legislation will not have 
uniform application. On the other hand, if it believes that a uniform result is 
desirable or perhaps even essential, it can amend the legislation in question. If 
Parliament chooses to amend the legislation, what approach will it adopt? Most 
likely, the approach will be chosen after a thorough comparative study that 
considers the impact on both legal systems. Once again, comparative law will 
be of undeniable practical importance. 
In short, decisions giving rise to non-uniform application of federal 
legislation could contribute to the development of comparative law in Canada 
and to the growth of hybrid law, at least at the federal level. Such an outcome is 
desirable: The still relatively new CCQ was the subject of in-depth analysis and 
careful study prior to its adoption, and its contribution to a hybrid law could be 
very valuable. Access to different legal systems and cultures provides exposure to 
different legal perspectives and fosters greater understanding of their respective 
strengths and weaknesses. The juxtaposition of the common law and civil law is 
136. Aline Grenon, “Setting the Stage: Comparative Law in Canada at the Dawn of the XXIst 
Century” in Grenon & Bélanger-Hardy, eds, Elements of Quebec Civil Law, supra note 15 at 
19-20 [Grenon, “Setting the Stage”].
137. Ibid.
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thought-provoking and in the federal context, this juxtaposition could lead not 
only to a hybrid law but also to better law.
For example, in 2012, the Minister of Finance proposed amendments to a 
number of acts, including the ITA.138 In explanatory notes provided to assist in 
understanding the proposed amendments, the Minister referred to differences in 
the common law and the civil law relating to gifts. He proposed a modification to 
the ITA that is more in keeping with the civil law approach but that will no doubt 
be received favourably in Canadian common law jurisdictions.139 The result is 
hybrid law and, arguably, better law.
In a remarkable essay that deserves to be translated into English, Jean-François 
Gaudreault-Desbiens140 examines the fate that might await section 8.1 of the 
138. Bill C-48, An Act to amend the Income Tax Act, the Excise Tax Act, the Federal-Provincial Fiscal 
Arrangements Act, the First Nations Goods and Services Tax Act and related legislation, 1st Sess, 
41st Parl, 2012 (first reading 21 November 2012); ITA, supra note 62.
139. Minister of Finance of Canada, “Gifts and Contributions – ITA 248(30) to (41)” in 
Explanatory Notes Relating to the Income Tax Act, the Excise Tax Act and Related Legislation 
(Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, October 2012), online: <http://www.fin.gc.ca/
drleg-apl/nwmm-amvm-1012n-05-eng.asp>. The Minister states:
At common law, it is generally the view that a gift includes only a property transferred 
voluntarily, without any contractual obligation and with no advantage of a material character 
returned to the transferor.
In contrast, under section 1806 of the Civil Code of Quebec (“CCQ”), a gift in Quebec is a 
contract by which ownership of property is transferred by gratuitous title. However, it may be 
possible for a transferor to transfer property, partly by gratuitous title, without any material 
advantage returned (as a gift) and partly by onerous title (for consideration). It  is therefore 
possible, in Quebec, to sell a property to a charity at a price below fair market value, resulting 
in a gift of the difference.
...
For the transfer of property to qualify as a gift, it is necessary that the transfer be voluntary and 
with the intention to make a gift. At common law, where the transferor of the property has 
received any form of consideration or benefit, it is generally presumed that such an intention 
is not present. New subsection 248(30) of the Act, which applies in respect of transfers of 
property after December 20, 2002 to qualified donees (such as registered charities), allows the 
opportunity to rebut this presumption. New paragraph 248(30)(a) provides that the existence 
of an amount of an advantage to the transferor will not necessarily disqualify the transfer 
from being a gift if the amount of the advantage does not exceed 80% of the fair market value 
of the transferred property.
140. Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens, Les solitudes du bijuridisme au Canada – Essai sur 
les rapports de pouvoir entre les traditions juridiques et la résilience des atavismes identitaires 
(Montreal: Éditions Thémis, 2007).
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Interpretation Act. He is concerned that lawyers and judges might attempt to limit 
the application of section 8.1, in light of “the traditional policy of containment of 
the civil law.”141 In his view, this traditional policy is the result of several factors: 
the unilingualism and unijuralism of the majority of Canadian jurists;142 indiffer-
ence towards Quebec civil law143 and even a certain mistrust of it;144 and finally, 
the feeling that the common law is superior to the civil law and that the latter 
need not be accorded real importance.145
To avoid this fate, Gaudreault-Desbiens suggests the following amendment 
to the Interpretation Act: 
[W]herever federal legislation cannot be interpreted as referring to some provincial 
jus commune and the meaning of the provision is still ambiguous after using the 
ordinary rules of interpretation, the provision should be interpreted in the way that 
is the most inter-subjectively legitimate from the common law as well as civil law 
perspective. …[W]here applicable, the best interpretation would be the one that 
does the least injury to the civil law and common law, which would inevitably lead 
to the development of a separate and partially mixed or hybrid federal law.146
However, he admits that it is “hard to anticipate exactly how the courts 
would give effect to the suggested rule.”147 In short, he is concerned that the 
courts might continue to limit the role played by Quebec civil law. I also share his 
concern. If the courts, and in particular the SCC, limit the influence of Quebec 
civil law in federal matters by pursuing “the traditional policy of containment 
of the civil law,”148 they are likely to reject solutions and approaches that could 
enrich Canadian law as a whole. The courts would in effect reject diversity in 
favour of uniformity based on just one legal system. The interaction of legal 
cultures, indeed the collision of those cultures, in particular through judgments 
recognizing the contributions of the civil law and the common law, could make a 
powerful contribution to the development of the law in Canada.
It is probably fair to say that authors who have examined the question of 
harmonization in the Canadian context, including those who have been most 
critical of the federal Parliament’s harmonization process, believe that the existence 
of different legal traditions within the Canadian federation is an important asset, 
141. Ibid at 122 [translated by author].
142. Ibid at 23, 28-29.
143. Ibid at 19, 25.
144. Ibid at 44.
145. Ibid at 57.
146. Ibid at 120 [translated by author].
147. Ibid at 122-23 [translated by author].
148. Ibid at 122 [translated by author].
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one that could give rise to dialogue and to productive exchanges. It is primarily 
with respect to the meeting-point of these traditions and the manner in which 
dialogue and exchanges could take place that differences of opinion arise. For 
example, Ruth Sullivan favours “derivative bijuralism or multijuralism in which 
federal legislation is routinely interpreted in light of all relevant legal systems 
(e.g., common law, civil law, aboriginal law, Islamic law, international law).”149 
Robert Leckey, who has criticized the federal harmonization process as being 
“top-down,” seems to favour legal pluralism instead, in which:
[W]ithout any idea of a permanent hierarchy or ordered structure, one legal order may 
well complement or complete another in particular circumstances. If in a particular 
context it is religious law that supplements the civil law, in another it may be the civil 
law supplementing religious law.150 
Leckey goes on:
However, it would be wrong to limit our viewpoint to duly constituted authorities: 
we should also keep in mind citizens who interpret or even oppose the law… . In 
legal pluralism, the subjects of law comply with the law, interpret it, but also create 
it… . While such reciprocity is part of any bottom-up operation, it is excluded from 
any top-down operation such as harmonization orchestrated by the federal govern-
ment. The pluralism of the citizen body—whose languages and legal identities go 
beyond the two official languages and two Western traditions—reflects back on the 
practice of harmonization.151
In his essay, however, Gaudreault-Desbiens demonstrated that there 
are powerful forces in the Canadian federation working against dialogue and 
exchange. Those forces seek instead to silence and contain. The views of Sullivan 
and Leckey, to the effect that courts, lawyers, or even citizens will of their own 
accord move towards multijuralism or legal pluralism, are unrealistic given the 
systemic resistance that exists. What is required is a climate that will encourage 
dialogue and exchange, through making use of various tools or “micro-strate-
gies to … overcome structural obstacles.”152 Could it not be said that these tools 
include section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act, and that if judges make use of that 
section when circumstances allow, they will encourage such dialogue and exchange?
These comments give rise to three proposals. 
SCC rules require that factums contain a reproduction of the legislation “in 
both official languages if they are required by law to be published in both official 
149. Sullivan, “Challenges,” supra note 21 at 1044.
150. Leckey, supra note 21 at 44-45 [translated by author].
151. Ibid at 45-46 [translated by author].
152. Gaudreault-Desbiens, supra note 140 at 113-14 [translated by author].
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languages.”153 A new amendment to these rules should be adopted whereby 
factums would also have to take into account the possible application of sections 
8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation Act when the interpretation of federal legislation 
is in issue. Since the SCC may take sections 8.1 and 8.2 into account ex officio,154 
it is likely better for the parties to be aware of the possible application of those 
sections when they are preparing their factums. This would give the parties the 
opportunity to examine the relevance of those sections in detail.
A second proposal involves legal education. It could play a vital role by 
providing all law students with the following:
1. a compulsory course introducing students to all the systems and 
traditions that form the Canadian legal landscape;
2. a compulsory course on legislation or statutory interpretation, 
including references to sections 8.1 and 8.2 of the Interpretation 
Act and to the rules relating to the interpretation of bilingual 
legislation; and
3. a program designed to foster one- or two-semester exchanges 
in Canadian law schools that emphasize other legal systems or 
traditions.
Relatively minor adjustments to law school curricula would suffice: making 
two courses compulsory and fostering pan-Canadian exchanges. It is true that 
graduates who have obtained dual or transystemic legal training in the programs 
offered by the University of Ottawa, McGill University, Université de Montréal, 
and Université de Sherbrooke law schools are deeply aware of the special features 
of Canadian law, but this knowledge should not be limited to that group. All law 
students must develop this awareness. The adjustments to law school curricula 
described above would in the medium term lead to greater openness by lawyers 
and the courts. Even if only a few faculties adopt this approach, they will send an 
important message to the Canadian legal community.
One final proposal: the creation of an independent federal body responsible 
for comparative law. There is no doubt that Canada is an “extraordinary place” 
in terms of comparative law. According to Esin Örücü, the comparative law 
scholar who coined the expression, an extraordinary place exhibits at least one 
of the following characteristics: (1) a place that is not a territory of civil law or 
of common law; (2) a place in which extraordinary things are happening; or 
(3) “a place where there has been transmigration of laws between legal systems 
153. Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, SOR/2002-156, r 42(2)(g).
154. Canada Evidence Act, supra note 123, s 18.
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characterized by both a legal and socio-cultural diversity creating either legal 
pluralism, a mixed jurisdiction, a hybrid system or unexpected results under 
pressure from a dominant elite.”155 Örücü argues that “the more ‘extraordinary’ 
the place, the more important comparative legal studies becomes.”156 In 2008, my 
colleague Louise Bélanger-Hardy and I argued that Canada, with its common, 
civil and indigenous law traditions, its two official languages and numerous 
recognized aboriginal languages, is obviously one such extraordinary place.157 “An 
enhanced knowledge of other traditions,” we argued,
will make it possible for legal professionals to begin or to pursue a critical examina-
tion of certain elements of their own traditions, to identify strengths and weak-
nesses, and perhaps change certain components in order to remedy problems that 
emerge from that examination. We believe that this is the direction that Canadian 
comparative law will take in the 21st century.158 
An independent federal body responsible for comparative law would be 
a major step in this direction. In addition to its general mandate to promote 
education and research in the field of comparative law, such an organization 
could also have other tasks, including analysis of the impact of decisions that, 
pursuant to the application of section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act, give rise to 
a non-uniform application of federal legislation. If, following this analysis, the 
organization concluded that uniform application was desirable, it could then 
suggest a legislative solution to Parliament that would be consistent with civil law 
and common law and that would avoid transposing inappropriate concepts onto 
either system. Such an organization would clearly demonstrate the intention of 
Parliament to take the contribution of Quebec civil law and Canadian common 
law into account in drafting and interpreting its legislation. Such an organization 
would probably minimize the tendency of judges to rely on sometimes dubious 
methods in order to achieve uniform application of federal legislation. This tendency 
is particularly harmful since few judges have the knowledge of comparative law 
required to assess the full impact of such decisions. Only Parliament, with the 
contribution of such an organization, is in a position to do so. Secure in the 
knowledge that remedial measures would be taken if necessary, judges would 
155. Esin Örücü, “Comparatists and extraordinary places” in Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday, 
eds, Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Translations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003) 467 at 469.
156. Ibid at 470.
157. “Setting the Stage,” supra note 136 at 22-23.
158. Ibid.
GRENON, CANADIAN BIJURALISM AT A CROSSROAD? 541
perhaps be more willing to apply section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act when it is 
appropriate to do so. 
V. CONCLUSION
This article analyzed ten SCC cases in order to identify trends in the application 
of section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act. Based on this relatively limited number 
of cases, it is still too early to arrive at any firm conclusions. While the SCC did 
not hesitate to apply section 8.1 in the first three cases, it appeared to move away 
from the section in the next four. In the more recent Innovation Credit Union and 
Radius Credit Union cases, the SCC applied section 8.1, but did so in the familiar 
context of interaction between federal legislation and the common law. In the 
latest case, Quebec AG, the decision to exclude section 8.1 was warranted.
It remains to be seen whether the SCC will exclude section 8.1 of the 
Interpretation Act when it is next faced with a situation in which provincial law 
complements a federal enactment and may give rise to non-uniform application 
of federal legislation. If the SCC distances itself from section 8.1 in such circum-
stances, we can expect a reduction of the role of Quebec civil law in interpreting 
federal legislation, and perhaps a return to the earlier practice whereby common 
law concepts were grafted onto Quebec civil law. If the SCC adopted this 
approach, would it not be curtailing Parliament’s intentions as expressed in 
section 8.1? If on the other hand the SCC applied section 8.1 as needed, this 
would necessarily increase the national role of Quebec civil law. DIMS159 and the 
proposed amendments to the ITA160 offer a glimpse of the positive ramifications 
that could follow.
Section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act makes it possible to interpret federal 
legislation while taking into account both Quebec civil law and Canadian 
common law. If section 8.1 is applied as it should be, courts will contrast and 
evaluate the two systems more often and encourage ongoing exchanges at the level 
of federal legislation between the civil and the common law. There is no doubt 
that, if it is not sidelined, section 8.1 of the Interpretation Act could contribute to 
the development of comparative and hybrid law in Canada.
159. Supra note 46.
160. See supra note 139.

